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Abstract - In this paper, we present a performance 
comparison between different digital evidence acquisition 
protocols in the cloud-computing environment. We focus on 
data confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity issues.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To protect the privacy of uninvolved users and prevent 
collateral intrusion in criminal investigations, one approach is 
to let the cloud¶V administrator send the relevant data to the 
LQYHVWLJDWRU DQG NHHS RWKHU XVHUV¶ GDWD VHFXUH 2Q WKH RWKHU
hand, the investigator might want to keep the administrator 
away from the investigation process. In this case, it is crucial 
to protect both the confidentiality and privacy of the 
investigation. To solve this problem, Hou et al. [1, 2] 
presented several solutions under the assumption that the 
cloud administrator is willing to cooperate with the 
investigator when searching for the relevant data. In this 
solution, the administrator is supposed to have responsibility 
for protecting the innocuous data from disclosure, yet at the 
same time, not allowed to know about the relevant data. 
However, without learning what the relevant data is, the 
administrator cannot judge if the relevant data is truly relevant 
to the crimes and cannot verify the investigator obtained other 
irrelevant data from the server. With respect to this problem, 
Hou et al. assume that the administrator can require the 
investigator to show what data was collected based on what 
keyword(s) were used when the relevant data is presented as 
evidence in court [1,2]. However, even if the assumption 
works, no measures can guarantee that the presented data 
came from the server and that no alteration had taken place. In 
other words, authenticity and integrity of the evidence 
collected in the work [1, 2] are not considered. The 
authenticity and integrity are two fundamental requirements 
for admissibility of evidence in court and they are crucial to 
winning a case. Therefore, we set forth our suggestions on 
how to prove the authenticity and integrity of the type of 
evidence collected in the Hou et al.¶work [1, 2].  
In [3], Hou et al. SURSRVHG DQ ³HQFU\SWLRQ-then-blind 
VLJQDWXUH ZLWK GHVLJQDWHG YHULILHU´ VFKHPH WR SURYH WKH
authenticity and integrity of the evidence in cloud 
environment. Hou et al. aim to improve the investigation 
efficiency and protect the privacy of innocent user. One 
strategy is to allow the server administrator to search, retrieve 
and hand only the relevant data to the investigator, where the 
administrator is supposed to be responsible for managing the 
data in a secure manner. There may be some elements due to 
their sensitivity or confidential nature that is might be prudent 
not to alert the administrator about it. In short, it is 
indispensable to consider how to protect both the 
confidentiality of the investigation and the privacy of 
uninvolved users in such forensic investigations. For 
simplicity of description, Hou et al. refer to this problem as 
³VHUYHU-DLGHG FRQILGHQWLDO IRUHQVLF LQYHVWLJDWLRQ´ :KHQ WKH
above-mentioned relevant data is presented as evidence during 
a trial, Hou et al. try to ensure that the administrator (or a third 
party that the administrator trusts) can verify whether the 
presented evidence is data that comes from the server and 
whether the evidence was altered or not. To mitigate these 
security breaches, Sign-Encrypt-Sign and Encrypt-Sign-
Encrypt techniques are used [4]. Sign-Encrypt-Sign and 
Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt suffers from computation, 
implementation, and communication overheads. Zheng [5] 
introduced the term signcryption in order to achieve greater 
efficiency than performing the signature and encryption 
operations separately.  
Zawoad et al.¶s research [6-10], concludes that reliability 
and accuracy of evidence are very important factors when 
evaluating evidence during a criminal investigation and 
prosecution. Thus, they offered to preserve the integrity of 
evidence before and after collecting it from the cloud 
environment E\ ¿UVW LGHQWLI\LQJ WKH UHTXLUHG SURSHUWLHV WR
support trustworthy forensics in the cloud. Based on the 
requirements, they proposed a forensics-enabled cloud 
architecture (FECloud) to preserve and provide required 
evidence while protecting the privacy and integrity of the 
evidence. FECloud is designed on top of Open stack that is a 
popular open source cloud-computing platform. Incorporating 
architectures like F(&ORXG PD\ LPSRVH VLJQL¿FDQW EXVLQHVV
impacts on Cloud Service Providers (CSP), as well as, 
customers. CSPs can attract more customers with the 
assurance of providing proper forensics support. Likewise, 
customers do not require large investment to establish their 
*corresponding author 
own forensics-friendly infrastructures. Based on the 
requirements, Zawoad et al. proposed a forensics-friendly 
architecture, FECloud. )(&ORXG LQWURGXFHV ¿YH QHZ
components in the existing OpenStack architecture namely: 
Logger (Themis), Data Possession (DP) Manager (Metis), 
Timestamp Manager (Chronos), Provenance Manager (Clio), 
and Proof Publisher (Brizo). The authors also add new 
modules with the OpenStack Block Storage (Cinder) and 
Nova Compute to communicate with the new components. 
OpenStack Dashboard (Horizon) and Identity manager 
(Keystone) are augmented to provide user interface (UI) and 
authentication to the proposed components. Finally, they 
designed a forensics-enabled image for VMs to support the 
forensics related features. By incorporating the proposed 
architecture, cloud providers may attract more customers with 
the assurance of reliable forensics support. Customers also do 
not need to establish privately owned, costly forensics-enabled 
computing/storage infrastructures for critical business 
applications. Therefore, Zawoad et al. designed FECloud, in 
order to preserve the trustworthiness of evidence. On the other 
hand, the proposed solution by Zawoad et al. does not include 
adequate security measures for data collection and data 
exporting out of the cloud. Thus, we assume that the collection 
of evidence could be targeted by different attacks by any 
intruder in the cloud. Another issue with the authors design 
where they collect their digital forensics data in one repository 
named Clio. This design suffers from single point of failure in 
case the data in Clio is destroyed or no communication with 
Clio is available.  
In a more recent work, Hou et al. [11] presented a privacy-
preserving approach for collecting evidence in forensic 
investigation. As the servers under investigation may store 
data from thousands or even hundreds of thousands of 
innocent. The investigator may have no right to access the 
irrelevant data. In particular, some of them may involve 
FRQ¿GHQWLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ $ simple solution would be to ask 
the server administrator to retrieve only the data relevant to 
the crime (or the suspect) and hand this to the investigator. 
This simple solution also may not work since the investigator 
may not want the administrator to know what he is looking for 
GXH WR WKH VSHFL¿FQDWXUHRI WKH FULPHV7KH DXWKRUV DVVXPH
that the server administrator is willing to cooperate, search the 
relevant data, and return all located data to the investigator 
whenever a warrant is provided. They assume that their 
solutions can satisfy the following security goals: Privacy, 
&RQ¿GHQWLDOLW\ ,QWHJULW\$XWKHQWLFLW\ (IILFLHQF\ DQG
0XOWLSOHLQYHVWLJDWRUV,Q>@WKHLQYHVWLJDWRUVSHFL¿HVVLQJOH
or multiple keyword(s) based on investigation subject, 
encrypts and sends it (or them) to the server administrator. 
7KHQWKHDGPLQLVWUDWRUHQFU\SWVDOOWKHGDWD¿OHVVWRUHGRQWKH
VHUYHUZKHUHHDFKGDWD¿OHLVUHSUHVHQWHGDVDVHWRIZRUGV
VHDUFKHV IRUHQFU\SWHGNH\ZRUGV LQ WKHHQFU\SWHGGDWD¿OHV
and returnVWKHUHOHYDQWGDWDLHWKHGDWD¿OHVFRQWDLQLQJWKH
keyword(s)) to the investigator. By searching the encrypted 
GDWD¿OHVZLWKHQFU\SWHGNH\ZRUGVWKHDGPLQLVWUDWRUKDVQR
idea of what keyword(s) the investigator is looking for; by 
performing investiJDWLRQ RQO\ RQ WKH UHOHYDQW GDWD ¿OHV
returned by the administrator, the investigator has information 
DERXWRWKHULUUHOHYDQWGDWD¿OHVLHWKHGDWD¿OHVWKDWGRQRW
contain the keyword(s)). It should be pointed out that while 
not perfect; keyword searching is currently the most widely 
recognized culling method in the area of digital forensics and 
e-discovery. The schemes for single keyword search on 
encrypted data are based on homomorphic encryption and 
commutative encryption, and the schemes for multiple 
keyword search are based on the protocol for privacy 
preserving set intersection. These schemes can satisfy privacy 
and confidentiality requirements. However, these schemes 
utilize encryption technology directly or indirectly, so the 
HI¿FLHQF\ PD\ EH D Foncern due to the time consuming 
encryption and decryption procedures on large amounts of 
data. Moreover, these schemes do not satisfy the 
Integrity/Authenticity. Questionable Integrity/Authenticity of 
data is not admissible in courts. These existing schemes can 
only handle multiple investigators by encrypting the data for 
each investigator. To tackle this problem, the authors propose 
the use of (t,n) threshold secret sharing schemes and their 
homomorphism properties to improve the investigation 
HI¿FLHQF\ Dnd verify the data integrity and authenticity. The 
proposed solution in Hou et al.¶ PRUH UHFHQW ZRUN >@ LV
based on searching predefined word list for a certain files in 
the evidence, which is not practically the target of digital 
forensics. In digital forensics, we might search the evidence 
several times; modify the word list depending on the 
requirements of the case and the findings that may change a 
lot. The claimed integrity and authenticity of the evidence here 
is doubtful. The administrator only searches for evidence in a 
defined collected file by himself. The mechanism for how to 
transfer the collected evidence to the investigator is not 
presented in a secure way. Another important thing is the 
added layer of a third party for comparing the word list with 
the evidence files, should more layer of trust and authenticity 
be required, which is not clarified from the authors. 
Authentication protocols are the basis of security in many 
distributed systems, and it is therefore essential to ensure that 
these protocols function correctly. Unfortunately, their design 
has been extremely error prone. Most of the protocols found in 
the literature contain redundancies or security flaws. In [4], 
Nasreldin et al., show that Hou et al.¶ VFKHPH >@ GRHV QRW
preserve its claimed integrity and authenticity. In [3], Hou et 
al. SURSRVHG DQ ³HQFU\SWLRQ-then-blind signature with 
GHVLJQDWHG YHULILHU´ VFKHPH WR SURYH WKH DXWKHQWLFLW\ DQG
integrity of the evidence in cloud environment. In [4], 
Nasreldin et al. show that the encrypt-then-sign scenario has a 
potential pitfall. Assume that Alice has discovered a 
breakthrough business idea and wants to inform her boss, 
Victor, about her discovery. Then, Alice will encrypt the 
PHVVDJH0XVLQJ9LFWRU¶VSXEOLFNH\DQGWKHQVLJQWKHUesult 
using her secret key. Next, Alice sends [{M}Victor ]Alice to 
Victor. However, Bob can set himself as a man-in-the middle 
and intercept messages from Alice to Victor. Bob can then use 
$OLFH¶V SXEOLF NH\ WR FRPSXWH ^0`Victor. Then, Bob signs it 
and sends [{M}Victor]Bob to Victor. When Victor receives 
[{M}Victor]Bob DQG YHULILHV %RE¶V VLJQDWXUH RQ LW 9LFWRU ZLOO
assume that Bob has made this astonishing discovery and 
Alice FDQQRWGLVSURYH%RE¶VFODLPDVVKRZQLQ)LJXUH1 and 
Figure 2. 
 
 Figure 1: Cryptanalysis - Step 1 
 
Figure 2: Cryptanalysis - Step 2 
 
Figure 3: Setup - New Secure Communication Design for 
Digital Forensics [12] 
 
 
Nasreldin et al.[4] presented a modification to Hou HW DO¶
scheme [3] in order to overcome the discovered security 
pitfalls by using three-block approach (i.e. Sign-Encrypt-Sign 
and Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt.). Confidentiality, authenticity, and 
integrity goals can be achieved through cryptographic 
algorithms. Information security aims to protect the 
availability, privacy, and integrity of data through the use of 
digital signature and encryption algorithms. Data 
confidentiality and data integrity are two of the most 
important functions of modern cryptography. There are two 
possible scenarios: Sign-Encrypt-Sign and Encrypt-Sign-
Encrypt. Both scenarios can resist the cipher-text forwarding 
attack and its consequences. To ensure confidentiality and 
chain of custody for the digital forensics process in the cloud, 
HoX HW DO¶ VFKHPH VHFWLRQ  LQ >@ QHHGV DQRWKHU
HQFU\SWLRQVWHSDWWKHVHQGHUVLGHDIWHUWKH³%OLQGVLJQDWXUH´
step (step number 2 in section 3.2 in [3]). At the recipient side, 
+RX HW DO¶ VFKHPH QHHGV DQRWKHU GHFU\SWLRQ VWHS DIWHU WKH
³6LJQDWXUHYHULILFDWLRQ´VWHS VWHSQXPEHU LQVHFWLRQ LQ
[3]). These are two extra steps (one block for encryption at the 
sender side and one block for decryption at the recipient side) 
are the mitigations for Hou et al.¶ VFKHPH DJDLQVW WKH
plaintext-subsection and cipher text stealing attacks. 
 
Nasreldin et al. [12] propose an identity-based 
signcryption protocol to reduce the computation, 
communication, and implementation overheads in evidence 
collecting in cloud forensics. Their proposed protocol is more 
efficient than all the previously presented protocols. It allows 
the recipient (verifier) to restore the message blocks upon 
receiving their corresponding signature blocks. The proposed 
protocol is perfect for some application requirements and it 
fits packet switched networks. The proposed protocol has two 
stages of verification to ensure that the message has been 
recovered efficiently and correctly. The first verification step 
is to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the message (e.g., 
no modification or substitution in the ciphertext ri ). The 
second verification step is to ensure that the message Mi is 
reconstructed successfully. This stage is useful for public 
verification in the case of a dispute takes place. It guarantees 
that the proposed protocol satisfies the non-repudiation 
property. Nasreldin et al.¶V details [12] are in Figure 3, Figure 
4, Figure 5, and Figure 6. 
Nasreldin et al. [12] show that the security of the proposed 
protocol is based on the intractability of reversing the secure 
cryptographic hash function and the Elliptic Curve Discrete 
Logarithm (ECDL) problem. Moreover, they analyzed the 
security of the proposed protocol in terms of authenticity, 
unforgeability, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and forward 
secrecy.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5: SignCrypt - New Secure Communication Design 
for Digital Forensics [12] 
 
Figure 4: KeyExtract - New Secure Communication 
Design for Digital Forensics [12] 
 
 
II. RSA VS. ECC ASYMETRIC CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
In this section, we show many comparisons on different 
platforms demonstrating that the proposed modification to 
Hou et al. (Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt) has lower execution times 
over ECC than RSA, TABLE I. 
Cryptography is used to transmit the data securely in open 
networks. The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) is used in 
many applications. ECC cryptosystem is better future option 
than RSA and discrete logarithm systems. For this reason ECC 
is an excellent choice for doing asymmetric cryptography in 
portable devices right now. The smaller ECC keys in turn 
makes the cryptographic operations that must be performed by 
the communicating devices that are to be embedded into 
considerably smaller hardware. Therefore, software 
applications may complete cryptographic operations with 
fewer processor cycles, and operations can be performed 
much faster, while still retaining equivalent security. This 
means, in turn, reduced power consumption, less space 
consumed on the printed circuit board, and software 
applications that run more rapidly creating lower memory 
demands. ECC has faster computations, reduced power 
consumption, as well as savings in memory space and 
bandwidth. In brief, for communication using smaller devices 
and asymmetric cryptosystem, we need ECC. The contrast in 
key lengths of RSA, Symmetric cryptosystems, and ECC are 
shown in TABLE II and Figure 7. Private keys are 12-times 
larger for RSA compared to ECC at the 128-bit security level, 
TABLE III. TABLE IV shows us the energy cost of RSA and 
ECC. 
ECC holds out the promise of a more cost efficient method 
to perform encryption and to secure transmission over 
internet.   Elliptic curves are believed to provide good security 
with smaller key sizes, something that is very useful in many 
applications. Smaller key sizes may result in faster execution 
timings for the schemes, which is beneficial to systems where 
real time performance is a critical factor. 
TABLE I.  ECC AND RSA (ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES) 
 ECC RSA 
Advantages 6PDOOHUNH\VFLSKHUWH[WV
and signatures. 
9HU\IDVWNH\JHQHUDWLRQ 
)DVWVLJQDWXUHV
moderately fast encryption/ 
decryption. 
Signatures can be 
computed in two stages. 
*RRGSURWRFROVIRU
authenticated key 
exchange. 
%HWWHU86JRYHUQPHQW
support. 
6SHFLDOFXUYHVZLWK
bilinear pairings allow new-
fangled crypto. 
)DVWYHU\VLPSOH
encryption and 
verification. 
(DVLHUWRimplement 
than ECC. 
(DVLHUWR
understand. 
6LJQLQJDQG
decryption are 
similar; encryption 
and verification are 
similar. 
:LGHO\GHSOR\HG
better industry 
support. 
Disadvantages &RPSOLFDWHGDQGWULFN\WR
implement securely. 
6WDQGDUGVDUHQ
Wstate-of-
the-art. 
6LJQLQJZLWKDEURNHQ
random number generator 
compromises the key. 
6WLOOKDVVRPHSDWHQW
problems. 
1HZHUDOJRULWKPVFRXOG
theoretically have unknown 
weaknesses. 
9HU\VORZNH\
generation. 
6ORZVLJQLQJDQG
decryption, which 
are slightly tricky to 
implement securely. 
7ZR-part key is 
vulnerable to Grater 
common Divisor 
(GCD) attack if 
poorly implemented. 
 
Due to the security issues, most new cryptographic 
protocols are moving away from RSA to elliptic curves. That 
transition is happening even faster in the embedded space 
where the ECC cost/performance benefits quickly become 
significant. 
 Figure 7: Comparison of Symmetric, RSA, and ECC Key Sizes 
In TABLE V, TABLE VI, and Figure 8, we give some 
sample timings for RSA and ECC on different platforms. In 
TABLE VI, RSAd is the private key operation, whereas RSAe 
is the public key operation. Figure 8 shows that the 163-bit 
ECC/1024-bit RSA security level, an elliptic curve 
exponentiation for general curves over arbitrary prime fields is 
roughly 5 to 15 times as fast as an RSA private key operation, 
depending on the platform and optimizations. At the 256-bit 
ECC/3072-bit RSA security level the ratio has already 
increased to between 20 and 60, depending on optimizations. 
To secure a 256-bit AES key, ECC-521 can be expected to be 
on average 400 times faster than 15,360-bit RSA. As seen in 
TABLE II, ECC (at the current minimum 1024-bit security 
level) has the computation time for the signer per message as 
22.9 ms instead of 188.7 ms in RSA case, TABLE VI (on 
StrongARM). Strong public-key cryptography is often 
considered to be too computationally expensive if not 
accelerated by cryptographic hardware. The proposed 
modification by Nasreldin et al. [4] contemplates an Encrypt-
Sign-Encrypt structure that could be implemented though 
RSA or ECC cryptosystems. TABLE I illustrates that ECC 
has more advantages over RSA. Moreover, TABLE VII 
elaborates on the execution times of Encrypt-Then-Sign and 
Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt on the Ultra SPARC II platform. Figure 
9 shows the comparison between execution times of the non-
secure Hou et al. scheme, the proposed modification based on 
RSA-Encrypt-Then-Sign, and the proposed modification 
based on the ECC-Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt on the Ultra SPARC 
II platform. Furthermore, TABLE VIII shows the execution 
times of Encrypt-Then-Sign and Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt on 
StrongARM platform. Figure 10 shows the comparison 
between execution times of non-secure Hou et al. scheme, 
proposed modification based on RSA-Encrypt-Then-Sign, and 
proposed modification based on ECC-Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt 
on StrongARM platform. All comparisons between the two 
proposed modifications (using Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt instead 
of Encrypt-Sign as Hou et al. suggested) illustrate that ECC 
has less key size and less computation time than RSA on all 
the selected platforms. 
TABLE IX shows that the new secure communication 
design for digital forensics [13] outperforms the proposed 
Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt (ECC) [4] in terms of low computation 
cost. Also, TABLE X shows a comparison between evidence 
acquisition protocols. 
TABLE II.  KEY SIZES FOR EQUIVALENT SECURITY LEVELS (IN BITS), [13-
19] 
Security bits 
(Key Size) 
Symmetric 
Encryption 
Algorithms 
Minimum Size (bits) of Public 
Keys 
RSA Key size 
(bits) 
Elliptic Curve 
Key Size (bits) 
80 Skipjack 1024 163 
112 3DES 2048 224 
128 AES-128 3072 283 
192 AES-192 7680 384 
256 AES-256 15360 571 
TABLE III.   ECC AND RSA KEY SIZE RATIO, [13-19] 
ECC 
key size 
163 283 384 571 
RSA 
key size 
1024 3072 7680 15360 
Key size 
ratio 
1 : 6 1 : 11 1 : 20 1 : 30 
TABLE IV.  ENERGY COST OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND KEY EXCHANGE 
COMPUTATIONS [19] 
Algorithm Signature Key Exchange 
 Sign Verify Client Server 
RSA 1024 304 11.9 15.4 304 
ECC 163 22.82 45.09 22.3 22.3 
RSA 2048 2302.7 53.7 57.2 2302.7 
ECC 224 61.54 121.98 60.4 60.4 
TABLE V.  ELLIPTIC CURVE EXPONENTIATION TIMING (MS), [15] 
Processor MHz 163-bit 224-bit 
Ultra SPARC II 450 6.1 8.7 
StrongARM 200 22.9 37.7 
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Figure 8: Comparison between execution times of RSA and ECC on     
                     Ultra SPARC II and StrongARM (in milliseconds) 
Figure 9: Execution times of Encrypt-Then-Sign and Encrypt-  
                     Sign-Encrypt on the Ultra SPARC II (in milliseconds) 
TABLE VI.  RSA ENCRYPT/DECRYPT TIMINGS (MS), [15] 
Processor MHz 1024- 
RSAd 
1024-
RSAe 
2048- 
RSAd 
2048-
RSAe 
Ultra SPARC II 450 32.1 1.7 205.5 6.1 
StrongARM 200 188.7 10.8 1273.8 39.1 
  
 
TABLE VII.  EXECUTION TIMES OF ENCRYPT-THEN-SIGN AND ENCRYPT-    
                                 SIGN-ENCRYPT ON THE ULTRA SPARC II (IN MILLISECOND) 
Key Size in 
bits 
Non-secure 
Hou et al. 
scheme 
Encrypt-
Then-Sign 
Proposed 
modification 
to Hou et al. 
scheme based 
on RSA 
Encrypt-Sign-
Encrypt 
Proposed 
modification 
to Hou et al. 
scheme based 
on ECC 
Encrypt-
Sign-Encrypt 
 
RSA ECC 
 1024 163 2(1.7+32.1) 
= 
67.6 
3(1.7+32.1) 
= 
101.4 
6*6.1 
= 
36.6 
2048 224 2(6.1+205.5) 
= 
423.2 
3(6.1+205.5) 
= 
634.8 
6*8.7 
= 
52.2 
 
 
 
 
TABLE VIII.  EXECUTION TIMES OF ENCRYPT-THEN-SIGN AND ENCRYPT-
SIGN-ENCRYPT ON THE STRONGARM (IN MILLISECOND) 
Key Size in 
bits 
Non-secure 
Hou et al. 
scheme 
Encrypt-Then-
Sign 
Proposed 
modification to 
Hou et al. 
scheme based 
on RSA 
Encrypt-Sign-
Encrypt 
Proposed 
modification to 
Hou et al. 
scheme based 
on ECC 
Encrypt-Sign-
Encrypt 
 
RSA ECC 
1024 163 2(10.8+188.7) 
= 
399 
3(10.8+188.7) 
= 
598.5 
6*22.9 
= 
137.4 
2048 224 2(39.1+1273.8) 
= 
2625.8 
3(39.1+1273.8) 
= 
3938.7 
6*37.7 
= 
226.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10: Execution times of Encrypt-Then-Sign and Encrypt-Sign-  
                     Encrypt on the StrongARM (in milliseconds) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE IX.  ARITHMETIC OPERATIONS IN NEW SECURE COMMUNICATION 
                              DESIGN FOR DIGITAL FORENSICS VS. ENCRYPT-SIGN-ENCRYPT 
 New Secure 
Communication Design 
for Digital Forensics 
Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt 
Sender SignCrypt: 
4 point_mul  
+ 1 point_add  
+ 1 mod_mul  
+ 3 hash  
+ 1 xor  
§ 
4 point_mul 
+ 1 point_add 
+ 1 mod_mul 
Encrypt-Sign-Encrypt: 
2 (2 point_mul + 1 
point_add)  
+ 1 point_mul  
+ 1 point_add 
§ 
5 point_mul  
+ 3 point_add 
  
Recipient UnSignCrypt 
3 hash  
+ 2 bilinear_map 
§ 
2 bilinear_map 
Decrypt-Verify-Decrypt: 
2 (1 point_mul + 1 
point_add) 
+ 2 point_mul 
+ 1 point_add 
Total 4 point_mul 
+ 1 point_add 
+ 1 mod_mul 
+ 2 bilinear_map 
9 point_mul 
+ 6 point_add 
point_mul: point multiplication over elliptic curve 
point_add: point addition over elliptic curve 
mod_mul: modular multiplication 
bilinear_map: bilinear pairing maps 
hash: cryptographic hash function operation 
XOR: BITWISE XOR LOGIC OPERATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE X.  COMPARISON BETWEEN EVIDENCE ACQUISITION PROTOCOLS 
Protocol Digital 
Forens
ics in 
the 
Cloud 
[112-
116] 
A 
Privacy-
Preservi-
ng 
Approa-
ch for 
Collecti-
ng 
Evidenc-e 
in 
Forensic 
Investiga-
tion 
[117] 
Verifying 
Data 
Authentic
ity and 
Integrit-y 
in 
Server-
Aided 
Confide-
ntial 
Forensic 
Investiga-
tion 
[6] 
Propo-
sed 
Encrypt
-Sign-
Encrypt 
[102] 
Proposed 
new 
Secure 
Commun
ication 
Design 
for 
Digital 
Forensics 
[125] 
Support 
Data 
Blocks 
No No No No Yes 
Receivi-
ng data 
out of 
order 
No No No No Yes 
Latency Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Authen-
ticity 
Yes Yes No 
(claimed 
Yes) 
Yes Yes 
Confid-
entiality 
No No 
(keyword 
only) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Integri-
ty 
Yes Yes No 
(claimed 
Yes) 
Yes Yes 
Non-
Repudi-
ation 
No No No Yes Yes 
Cloud 
compat-
ibility 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Secure 
connect-
ion for 
data 
collecti-
on and 
transfer 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Develop
ing New 
Crypto-
graphic 
Scheme 
No No No No Yes 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a performance 
comparison between different digital evidence acquisition 
protocols in the cloud-computing environment. We have also 
illustrated that some of these protocols do not achieve the 
claimed security goals. The performance analysis shows that 
ECC based protocols have less execution time than RSA 
based protocols. 
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